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Abstract
Pronoun comprehension is facilitated for referents that are focused in the discourse context. 
Discourse focus has been described as a function of attention, especially shared attention, but few 
studies have explicitly tested this idea. Two experiments used an exogenous capture cue paradigm 
to demonstrate that listeners’ visual attention at the onset of a story influences their preferences 
during pronoun resolution later in the story. In both experiments trial-initial attention modulated 
listeners’ transitory biases while considering referents for the pronoun, whether it was in response 
to the capture cue or not. These biases even had a small influence on listeners’ final interpretation 
of the pronoun. These results provide independently-motivated evidence that the listener’s 
attention influences the on-line processes of pronoun comprehension. Trial-initial attentional shifts 
were made on the basis of non-shared, private information, demonstrating that attentional effects 
on pronoun comprehension are not restricted to shared attention among interlocutors.
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Understanding language frequently requires listeners to find referents for pronouns, for 
example in sentences like Athena went skiing with Sylvia, and she fell down. Listeners 
typically do so quite rapidly, despite the frequent ambiguity of pronouns, in part because 
they can draw on extra-linguistic information from the previous discourse and nonlinguistic 
context. Some entities (e.g., recently or prominently mentioned ones) are perceived as better 
referents. These are called focused or salient in the discourse, and are typically more 
accessible during the interpretation of subsequent referring expressions (Ariel, 1990; Bock 
& Irwin, 1980; Chafe, 1994; Grosz, Joshi, & Weinstein, 1995; Gundel, Hedberg, & 
Zacharaski, 1993; see Arnold, 1998, 2008, 2010 for reviews). The link between cognitive 
status and pronoun comprehension is widely accepted, but there are many open question 
about the mechanisms by which information becomes mentally privileged, and how this 
status affects pronoun comprehension.
One view suggests that some information is represented in memory in such a way that it is 
easier to access, and that this facilitates the comprehension of reference, in particular 
underspecified forms like pronouns. This mental status has been described as “salience”, 
“accessibility”, “activation”, “givenness”, “topicality” or “prominence” (for example, Ariel, 
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1990, 2001; Arnold, 1998, 2008, 2010; Bower & Morrow, 1990; Brennan, 1995; Chafe, 
1994; Foraker & McElree, 2007; Garnham, Traxler, Oakhill, & Gernsbacher, 1996; Gundel, 
Hedberg, & Zacharski, 1993; Givón, 1983; Grosz, Joshi, & Weinstein, 1995; Kaiser & 
Trueswell, 2004). Although existing proposals differ in important details, they share the use 
of nonlinguistic mental representations as explanations for both speakers’ choices in 
production, and listeners’ preferences in comprehension. This mental status is often assumed 
to be a gradient representation (e.g., Ariel, 1990; Arnold, 1998; Chafe, 1994), although 
many theories suggest that there is also a single most highly focused referent (Gundel, 
Hedberg, & Zacharski, 1993; Givón, 1983; Grosz, Joshi, & Weinstein, 1995; Stevenson et 
al., 2000). For example, following the sentence Sofia jumped high on the trampoline, the 
character Sofia is highly salient, and the most likely referent of a matching pronoun, e.g. … 
and she laughed. By contrast, entities that are unrelated to the current situation are 
extremely low in salience, and are unlikely to be considered as potential referents for 
pronouns.
The question we ask here is whether pronoun comprehension is influenced by the listener’s 
attention. This is a question worth asking, because there is uncertainty in the literature about 
whether the mechanism behind pronoun comprehension relies on actual, psychological 
attention, or a language-specific category that is called “in focus”. On one hand, some 
scholars discuss referential salience in terms of how it relates to the speaker’s assumptions 
about the listener’s attention (Gundel et al., 1993; Chafe, 1994) or memory (Ariel, 1990, 
2001). On the other hand, much of the literature uses a more discourse-specific notion, 
termed simply “the focus” (e.g., Dahan et al., 2002; McKoon, Greene, & Ratcliff, 1993; 
Marslen-Wilson, Tyler, & Koster, 1993; Stephenson, Crawley, & Kleinman, 1994). The 
implication is that “in focus” information is also that which is attended by the discourse 
participants, but in some cases the link between attention and discourse focus is not explicit. 
Moreover, there have been few explicit tests of whether attention is actually involved in the 
representation of discourse entities, or how. Is it that pronoun comprehension is driven by a 
language-specific category that we call “focus”, or by actual fluctuations in attention?
The answer to this question is not straightforward. The linguistic context has been proposed 
to define what is in focus, and what is not. We do know that the linguistic context affects 
reference comprehension generally, and pronoun comprehension specifically. Listeners tend 
to perceive as accessible those things that were recently mentioned, especially those 
mentioned in prominent linguistic positions like subject or first-mentioned position (Ariel, 
1990; Arnold, Eisenband, Brown-Schmidt, & Trueswell, 2000; Chafe, 1976; Clark & 
Sengul, 1979; Givón, 1983, Brennan, 1995; Gordon, Grosz, & Gilliom, 1993), or the focus 
of a cleft (Almor, 1999; Arnold, 1998; Cowles, Walenski, & Kleunder, 2007; Foraker & 
McElree, 2007). Yet the causal relationship between discourse focus and attention is 
unclear. It may be that discourse context affects both pronoun comprehension and attention 
separately, or it may be that the discourse context affects the listener’s attention, and it is 
these attentional fluctuations that drive pronoun comprehension. Which, then, guides 
pronoun comprehension – the discourse context or the attended state of some referents? 
Despite the frequent use of attention to explain discourse status effects during processing, 
there has been little direct assessment of its psychological role.
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The one study that directly tested this question was Foraker & McElree (2007). They tested 
the hypothesis that linguistic focus leads to the active maintenance of a single entity in focal 
attention, using clefts to manipulate linguistic focus (e.g., It was the new foreman who 
unrolled the latest blueprint. He… ). Following McElree’s work on memory in the n-back 
task (2001), they argued that focal memory should lead to faster retrieval of the antecedent. 
However, they found that clefting did not affect speed, and instead only affected the 
likelihood of successfully retrieving the antecedent for the pronoun. They concluded that 
clefting does not result in actively maintaining the referent representation in focal attention, 
but instead affected the strength with which the representation of the character was encoded. 
Nevertheless, their findings are consistent with the broader proposal that discourse 
representations vary in their cognitive status. Moreover, they do not answer the larger 
question of whether this cognitive status is purely a linguistic constraint, or whether it is 
modulated by attentional processes that are not comparable to the processing needed for n-
back tasks.
In this paper we tackle this question with a new approach, focusing on nonlinguistic, 
nonpublic modulations of the listener’s attention. We hypothesize that the listener’s 
discourse representation is modulated by their private attentional fluctuations, in addition to 
known effects of the linguistic context. In particular, when two entities are mentioned in an 
utterance, we hypothesize that attention to one of them can increase its mental accessibility, 
and thus its availability during later pronoun comprehension. Here we use the term 
“referential accessibility” to represent the privileged cognitive status (aka salience, 
prominence, etc.) that is predicted to facilitate pronoun comprehension. We assume that 
accessibility varies along a continuum (following Ariel, 1990; 2001; Arnold, 1998; Arnold 
& Griffin, 2001), and thus attention to an entity might result in a more activated or 
elaborated representation (Almor, 1999; Gernsbacher, 1990; McDonald & MacWhinney, 
1990), for example making it easier to retrieve.
In order to dissociate the effects of attention from the linguistic context itself, we examine 
participants’ allocation of visual attention to discourse entities at the onset of the trial, and 
examine the relationship between this initial attention and later pronoun processing. Our 
critical question is thus the following: in a story that mentions two characters at the 
beginning (e.g., “Doggy picked apples with Birdy… ”), does increased attention on one 
character affect later pronoun processing?
We examine this question by measuring listeners’ visual attention to each character as the 
story begins. In our task, visual attention at the start of the story is driven by a variety of 
item- and participant-specific constraints, as well as our visual capture manipulation. We 
focus on listeners’ immediate interpretations of the pronoun, as it is encountered and 
immediately afterward – that is, online processing. We expect that in this domain we are 
most likely to observe any effects of attention over and above discourse biases. These on-
line biases are then compared to measures of final, off-line interpretations of the pronoun.
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Does attention underlie accessibility? Three hypotheses
The literature on reference processing and discourse representation suggests that there are 
three ways in which attention may be involved in the accessibility of discourse information. 
These hypotheses differ in their dependence on linguistic vs. nonlinguistic information, and 
shared vs. unshared information.
Accessibility as shared attention
One possibility is that pronoun comprehension is sensitive to the salience of only shared 
information. Here we use the term shared attention to denote information that one person 
considers likely to be attended by their discourse partner – that is, the attended portion of 
common ground. This is a somewhat weaker definition than joint attention, which may 
require both participants to be aware that the other is attending (Tomasello, 1995).
The importance of shared attention emerges in several accounts of referent accessibility. For 
example, Gundel et al.’s (1993) Givenness Hierarchy explains the cognitive status of 
discourse entities in terms of “assumptions that a cooperative speaker can reasonably make 
regarding the addressee’s knowledge and attention state” (p. 275; see also Bard, Anderson & 
Sotillo, 2000; Brennan, 1995; Chafe, 1994; Levelt, 1989). This approach suggests that 
reference processing is only affected by evidence about the attention of one’s interlocutor 
(see also Clark & Marshall, 1981).
The characterization of accessibility in terms of shared attention fits well with known 
discourse effects. The linguistic context is a public record of the current task. Interlocutors 
have good reason to assume that linguistic co-presence (Clark & Marshall, 1981) is a strong 
indicator of shared knowledge. Thus, the discourse record is a good estimate of what is 
mutually attended by discourse participants. In keeping with this, the effects of linguistic 
context on pronoun comprehension are often explained in terms of attention.
However, information that is in shared attention doesn’t have to stem from linguistic 
sources. You could imagine watching a juggler perform on the street and saying “Wow, he’s 
amazing” to the stranger next to you. The pronoun would be fully interpretable, based on 
evidence of physical co-presence, and physical cues like posture and eyegaze that indicate 
shared attention on the juggler -- even if the juggler had not been previously mentioned.
Nevertheless, there is little work that directly examines the effects of nonlinguistic shared 
attention on the accessibility of discourse entities. Instead, what work exists in this domain 
looks at nonlinguistic cues that co-occur with the referring expression itself. For example, 
eyegaze and pointing gestures facilitate the comprehension of both definite NPs (Hanna & 
Brennan, 2008), and pronouns (Goodrich & Hudson Kam, 2008, 2009, Nappa & Arnold, 
2014). These findings leave open the question of whether shared attention affects the 
discourse representation itself. Thus, claims about the importance of shared attention are 
best supported by evidence about the importance of the linguistic context, making it difficult 
to distinguish accounts of accessibility as shared attention vs. accounts of accessibility as a 
linguistic construct.
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Accessibility as egocentric attention
On the other hand, some researchers emphasize the attention of the comprehender. Bower 
and Morrow (1990; see also Morrow, Bower, & Greenspan, 1987, 1989) suggest that readers 
use mental models to represent the objects and characters in a discourse, and as they move 
through the discourse their attention shifts to the physical location in their mental 
representation. This raises a second possibility: it is individual, non-joint attention that 
guides accessibility. Likewise, discourse cues like first-mentioned status or recency could 
directly modulate the listeners’ focus of attention without requiring representations of joint 
attention (Arnold, 2008). Because of this possibility, it is difficult to tease out the role of the 
listener’s own attention from evidence of social cues to attention, like eyegaze.
Note that our question here is about whether egocentric attention affects the accessibility of 
discourse representations, and not about the listener’s attention at the moment of 
encountering the pronoun, which does not appear to be influenced by noncommunicative 
visual cues (Nappa & Arnold, 2014)
Accessibility as a language-specific construct
A third possibility is that discourse information affects reference processing because there 
are discourse-specific rules that make some entities preferred as referents (e.g., first-
mentioned ones). In fact, there must be some contribution of language-specific rules, since 
languages like Finnish have different pronouns that respond to different aspects of the 
linguistic context (Kaiser & Trueswell, 2008). More generally, the textual information in the 
discourse goes a long way toward predicting the preferred referent for a pronoun (Arnold, 
1998). Centering Theory is a computational model that aims to use the text to make such 
predictions (Grosz, et al., 1995; also see Walker, Prince, & Joshi 1998 and papers within). In 
Centering, the highest-ranked entity referred to in the next utterance is the “center of 
attention.” But it is unclear whether “center” is just a discourse category, or a description of 
a psychological state of the discourse participants. In fact, Grosz and Sidner (1986) state 
explicitly that in their model (a precursor to Centering theory), “The attentional state is a 
property of the discourse itself, not of the discourse participants,” (p. 179). While this model 
implies that there is a relationship between discourse focus and psychological attention, the 
proposed mechanism for representing discourse status is an abstraction. In sum, the 
importance of the linguistic context is well-established, but these models are consistent with 
both accessibility as a language-specific construct, and accessibility as shared attention.
In this paper we examine whether pronoun comprehension is sensitive to fluctuations in 
accessibility that go beyond both shared information and linguistic rules about accessibility. 
To do so, we cannot simply examine the effects of the linguistic context, because as we have 
argued, these could guide reference comprehension either directly, or by affecting attention 
to discourse elements. We therefore turn to a nonlinguistic domain: visual attention.
Visual attention as a window onto referential accessibility
Visual attention offers a promising window onto questions about where referential 
accessibility comes from, because it is provides a measure of the listener’s attention that can 
be both nonlinguistic and stem from sources that are not a part of the public discourse. For 
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example, imagine that a worker is giving a tour to a new secretary, and says Here’s your 
office. It’s nice and sunny. If the secretary happens to be gazing at the desk during this 
conversation, it would not change the fact that the desk is an inappropriate interpretation of 
the pronoun it. However, the linguistic context can sometimes include more than one 
referent, and the relative accessibility of each is somewhat ambiguous. For example, the 
worker may say The phone is kept under the desk. It’s pretty small, and we need to keep it 
clear for paperwork. In this case, the pronoun it refers to the desk, even though it is 
moderately less accessible than the phone, which was mentioned first in the preceding 
sentence. The listener’s own attention to the desk (for whatever reason) might modulate its 
relative accessibility, and facilitate processing of the pronoun it.
We therefore use visual attention as a way to examine whether attention is involved in 
discourse accessibility. The strongest support for an attentional role in accessibility would be 
evidence that accessibility effects are modulated by attentional variation that comes from 
nonlinguistic, nonshared sources. For example, if the sun happens to light up the desk and 
attract the listener’s attention, it shouldn’t overturn the effects of the public, shared 
discourse. But can it push the listener’s attention to one of the task-relevant objects? 
Similarly, if the listener’s attention is attracted to the desk for idiosyncratic reasons, does it 
change pronoun processing?
Measures of visual attention provide a good testing ground for the nature of linguistic focus 
of attention, because visual attention does not clearly map onto the linguistic category of 
focus. The “discourse focus” (or “center of attention”) is typically used to describe 
backgrounded, given, topical referents -- i.e., those that are highly expected to be mentioned 
again. By contrast, visual attention is often attracted to objects that are new and need further 
processing, (see Bock, Irwin, & Davidson, 2004, for discussion) – e.g., those that appear 
suddenly (e.g. Jonides & Yantis, 1988; Remington, Johnston & Yantis, 1992), are unfamiliar 
(e.g. Brockmole & Boot, 2009; Theeuwes, 1994), or do not fit thematically with the scene 
(De Graef, Christiaens, & d’Ydewalle, 1990; Henderson, Weeks, & Hollingworth., 1999; 
Loftus & Mackworth, 1978, van der Muelen, Meyer, & Levelt, 2001).
There is reason to believe that visual attention might impact speakers’ choices during 
reference production, given research on the speaker’s choices about how to begin an 
utterance. For example, speakers tend to choose syntactic structures that allow them to begin 
their utterances with information that is more accessible conceptually or lexically (Bock, 
1982; 1986; Bock et al., 2004; Ferreira & Dell, 2000; Ferreira, 2003; Gleitman et al., 2007; 
Tomlin, 1997). This accessibility is influenced by the same kinds of things as referential 
accessibility, e.g. the preference to order given before new (Arnold, Wasow, Losongco, & 
Ginstrom, 2000; Hawkins, 1994; Bock & Irwin, 1980). In addition, speakers tend to choose 
structures that allow them to begin their utterance with the referent that they initially fixated 
in a scene (Gleitman et al., 2007). Even more striking, Gleitman et al. were able to modulate 
the speaker’s choice of starting point by manipulating their attention with an exogenous 
attentional capture cue. Speakers described scenes with two characters. Immediately before 
the picture appeared, a black square appeared for 80 ms, which increased the likelihood of 
starting the sentence with the cued character. These results suggest that visual and linguistic 
attention overlap at some level, despite their differences (but for a different interpretation 
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see Bock et al. 2004). The current study examines a parallel question: does attention (as 
measured by visual attention) contribute to accessibility effects in comprehension?
Does visual attention modulate the accessibility of discourse entities?
Two experiments tested the role of nonshared attention on pronoun comprehension. In both 
experiments, we monitored listeners’ eye movements as they listened to a short story about 
two same-gendered characters, which included a pronoun that referred to one of them. We 
were particularly interested in the role that attention plays at the start of the discourse, as 
participants set up a representation of the story. In a story like Doggy picked apples with 
Birdy…, the story itself only provides partial information about who the discourse focus is. 
The first-mentioned/subject referent is generally considered more accessible (Arnold, 2010; 
Arnold, 2001; Brennan, 1995; Gernsbacher & Hargreaves, 1988; Gernsbacher et al., 1989; 
Järvikivi et al., 2005; Kaiser & Trueswell, 2004), but this is only a partial constraint. That is, 
the linguistic cues to accessibility are ambiguous. In this situation, the listener’s attention at 
story onset may modulate the strength of the first-mention bias. This study is the first (to our 
knowledge) that examines the relationship between attention at the onset of a story and later 
pronoun comprehension.
As a measure of listeners’ attention at story onset, we measured their fixations to discourse 
characters in the first second of the story. Although visual fixation is not isomorphic with 
visual attention (Mack, 2003), we did not restrict participants from making eye movements, 
which means that their looks were good indicators of their visual attention (see discussion in 
Chelazzi et al., 1995). In addition, our task encouraged participants to attend to the visual 
display by asking them to indicate whether the story matched the text (Arnold et al., 2000). 
This meant that visual fixations were a reasonable approximation of their attention to 
discourse characters.
We specifically wanted to examine how discourse processing was influenced by attentional 
modulations that were not limited to the linguistic input. We expected the listener’s attention 
to fluctuate as a result of the visual stimulus, for example the tendency to view a picture 
from left to right (Dahan, Tanenhaus, & Salverda, 2007), as well as other idiosyncratic item 
properties. In addition, we introduced a modulation of the listener’s attention via an 
attentional capture cue. Several studies have shown that visual attention is automatically 
captured by sudden onset cues, for example a black square on a red background (Folk, 
Remington, & Johnson, 1992; Folk et al., 1992; Jonides, 1981; Hopfinger & Mangun, 1998; 
Müller & Rabbit, 1989). This kind of capture cue is clearly not a part of the discourse itself, 
and should not affect pronoun comprehension – especially when the listener was not aware 
of it.
On the other hand, people are not always adept at ignoring information that is egocentrically 
available when participating in a joint activity like conversation. For example, expressions 
like “the blue triangle” are interpreted by considering both what information is available to 
the speaker (i.e., what is in common ground), and what objects in one’s own ground are 
good matches for the input (Hanna, Tanenhaus, & Trueswell, 2003; Hanna & Tanenhaus, 
2004; Keysar, Barr, Balin & Paek, 1998; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner 2000). 
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Furthermore, any representations of joint attention must be processed by the listener’s 
internal cognitive system. Egocentrically attended information may therefore leak into 
calculations of shared attention. Such “leakage” effects may be especially apparent when 
they are partially consistent with shared information (as in the desk example). Nevertheless, 
effects of nonshared attention would provide the strongest evidence that pronoun 
comprehension is driven by attention per se, and not just discourse context.
Our use of a story context provided a fairly natural use of pronouns. It also meant that the 
effects of the listener’s attention were tested in the context of discourse cues, specifically the 
known preference to interpret a pronoun as co-referential with a first-mentioned/ subject 
referent, rather than a second-mentioned/ nonsubject referent (Arnold et al., 2000; Gordon et 
al., 1993). We predicted strong effects of the discourse context. The critical question was 




Participants—A total of 86 psychology students at UNC Chapel Hill participated in 
exchange for course credit. Data from 13 participants were not analyzed at all, because the 
participants reported on a voluntary questionnaire that they had noticed the flashes (n = 11) 
or that they had attention deficit disorder (n=2). An additional 21 participants were excluded 
because of problems with their fixations. The fixations for each participant were visualized 
using McMurray’s EyeAnal software (2002), and those with excessive drifting were 
excluded. Participants were also excluded if more than 30% of their trials were unusable due 
to track loss, or if the participant had not fixated either the target or competitor during the 
entire trial (i.e. they used peripheral vision). This left 52 participants in the analysis.
Stimuli—The basic task paradigm was adapted from that used by Arnold et al. (2000). 
Participants viewed a picture on a PC computer (see Figure 1) while listening to a spoken 
story. All experimental verbal stimuli contained two sentences, e.g. Birdy picked apples with 
Doggy near the farmhouse. He was wearing a hat to protect himself from the sun. The first 
sentence introduced two same-gender characters, either Doggy and Birdy (male), or Kitty 
and Bunny (female). The introductory sentence mentioned one character in subject, first-
mentioned position (N1), and the other in nonsubject, second-mentioned position (N2). Each 
character (Birdy, Doggy, Kitty, Bunny) was N1 five times. The second sentence began with 
a pronoun that referred to one of the characters; this was the target word. The referent of the 
pronoun was either a) the first-mentioned (N1) or b) the second-mentioned (N2) character 
from sentence 1. The pronoun referent was manipulated by changing the picture so that the 
disambiguating characteristic (e.g., wearing a hat) coincided with the intended referent. The 
disambiguating word (e.g., hat) always occurred after the verb; for example, in this picture 
both characters are wearing something, but only one is wearing a hat. This created an 
ambiguous period during which the scene was consistent with both pronoun interpretations 
(He was wearing a). The critical question was where participants would look in during the 
period of time immediately following the pronoun. During the ambiguous period, the 
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proportion of looks to a character are assumed to reflect a consideration of that character as 
a referent, all other things being equal.
The experimental verbal stimuli used two verb types in the first sentence: 1) Joint-action, 
e.g. Birdy picked apples with Doggy, or Kitty went sightseeing with Bunny; and 2) Source-
Goal, e.g. Bunny showed a sculpture to Kitty, or Kitty floated over to Bunny. Eight items 
were source-goal, and 12 were joint action. Verb type was controlled because it is known to 
influence the relative accessibility of its arguments; for example goal arguments are slightly 
more accessible than source arguments (Arnold, 2001; Rohde, Kehler, & Elman, 2007; 
Stevenson, Crawley, & Kleinman, 1994). However (see below), in this experiment it had 
little effect on our outcome measures.
The experimental visual stimuli contained two characters, one on each side of the screen. 
These were always in the same ports, equidistant from the center of the screen. A third 
object always appeared in the top center (e.g., the barn). These three objects were 
equidistant from the center and from each other. In some pictures there was also a fourth 
object in the center (e.g., the tree). The displayed picture took up the entire 1280 × 1024 
resolution screen. The characters filled left and right ports that were 352 × 402 pixels in size.
Immediately preceding the story picture, a brief visual capture screen appeared for 200 
msec. This screen pictured a 38 × 38-pixel black square in the location of one of the 
characters, as a manipulation of visual attention (cf. Gleitman et al., 2007). On filler trials 
the capture cue appeared in other locations.
Figure 2 illustrates the time course of stimuli for each trial. Participants clicked a GO button 
to initiate the trial, which was followed by a white screen with a black square in the location 
of one of the two characters. After 200 msec the square disappeared and the picture 
appeared, and 200 msec later the story began to play. The goal of this experiment was to test 
whether attention would modulate pronoun processing, in a situation where it was clearly 
not a part of the discourse record. The strongest way to achieve this was to ensure that 
participants would not be aware of the presence of the capture cue. Pilot testing revealed that 
a 200-msec sudden onset cue was not noticed by most participants. Post-experimental 
questionnaires confirmed this, and anyone who reported any suggestion of awareness of the 
cue was excluded from analysis (N=11).
Each trial was followed by a screen asking participants to press a button to indicate if the 
story and picture matched. A following screen prompted participants to provide an 
explanation for No-Match responses. This allowed us to identify rejections of the story that 
revealed a strong preference to identify the pronoun with the other character. For example, 
in the second-mentioned condition of the example, the story said He’s wearing a hat, the 
picture showed Doggy in a hat. If the participant said Birdy isn’t wearing a hat, it was taken 
as evidence that they couldn’t accept Doggy as the pronoun referent.
Design—The experimental design was 2 (pronoun target N1 vs. N2) × 2 (target cued vs. 
target not cued). Several properties of the stimuli were balanced across the stimuli set, 
including verb type (joint action vs. source-goal), target location (left vs. right side of the 
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screen), and N1 character (Doggy, Birdy, Kitty, Bunny). 20 experimental items were 
pseudo-randomized with 8 filler items in four lists, each of which had both a forwards and a 
backwards version. Of the 8 fillers, 6 had stories that were not intended to match the picture 
for reasons that had nothing to do with pronominal reference (e.g., Doggy went boating one 
summer… when the picture showed Doggy snorkeling). There were two practice items, one 
that matched and one that did not match. The practice and filler items had one, two, or three 
characters, but used different structures and had no ambiguous pronouns. There was an 
attentional capture cue on all fillers, but in different locations.
Apparatus—We monitored participants’ eye movements with a head-mounted Eyelink II 
eyetracker as they viewed the display and listened to the story. Eye position was sampled at 
a rate of one datapoint every 4 msec (250 Hz), but the data were converted to a granularity 
of one data point for every 16 msec (62.5 Hz) prior to analysis to speed processing 
(McMurray, 2002). Corneal reflection monitoring was used when possible (n=37); the pupil-
only monitoring mode was used if we could not achieve adequate calibration with the 
corneal reflection mode (n=27). We analyzed only one eye, using the Eyelink automatic 
procedure for choosing the eye with better calibration. Calibration always received the 
highest rating of “good” by the Eyelink program (max deviation: x = 26.1 pixels, y = 118.4 
pixels), otherwise the participant was re-calibrated. At analysis, fixations were allowed to 
deviate by 100 pixels to account for possible calibration error or calibration drift over the 
course of the experiment. This did not result in any overlap in the critical character ports.
The visual and auditory stimuli were presented on a PC computer running the ExBuilder 
software (an in-house software created at the University of Rochester; Longhurst, 2006), 
running on a PC computer with a 19″ monitor (resolution: 1280 × 1024 pixels, refresh rate: 
75 Hz).
Procedure—We gave participants a general description of the task. Then participants were 
calibrated using Eyelink’s 9-point calibration and validation procedure. Participants sat at 
the display computer so they could comfortably reach the mouse; viewing distance was 
approximately 22–34 inches. After calibration, participants were introduced to the characters 
in the stories and asked to name sample pictures of each character. Participants then 
performed two practice trials and were given a chance to ask questions. Then the 
experimental session began. Participants clicked on a crosshair at the center of the screen to 
begin each trial. During each trial, participants viewed a picture and listened to the story. 
When each story finished playing, another screen appeared which asked participants to 
indicate whether the story matched the picture by clicking a YES or NO button. A following 
screen asked participants to explain any NO responses out loud to the experimenter. A post-
experiment questionnaire was used to assess participants’ knowledge of the purpose behind 
the experiment, and whether they were aware of the capture cue.
Logic of analyses and statistical methods—Of primary interest in this study are the 
mechanisms that occur during language comprehension, as listeners attempt to identify a 
referent for ambiguous pronouns. Our interest in listener’s on-line (i.e., momentary) biases 
stems from the assumption that they are related to the mechanism of arriving at a final 
interpretation. To this end, we first focus on evidence of participants’ gaze immediately after 
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the pronoun, and consider how this relates to their final interpretation. As a secondary 
analysis, we also present the results of the off-line picture/story match task. In both cases, 
the purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between visual attention at the start 
of the story and later pronoun interpretation. We therefore also present analyses of eye gaze 
at the onset of the trial.
Eye gaze analysis procedure
Dependent variable: Eye movement data throughout the paper are presented in terms of 
looks, where a look is defined as a fixation grouped together with the prior saccade. This 
categorization is often used in language studies, which aim to measure the period of time 
during which listeners were directing their attention toward one referent and not another 
(e.g., Arnold, Hudson-Kam & Tanenhaus, 1997; McMurray, Tanenhaus, & Aslin, 2009; 
Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers, & Carlson, 1999 and J. Sedivy, personal communication, 
March 2009; Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill, & Logrip, 1999 and J. Trueswell, personal 
communication; March 2009). The onset of the saccade represents the decision to begin 
looking at that object, and this look continues until the launch of a new saccade. Saccades 
were identified using Eyelink’s on-line parser, which uses a velocity and acceleration-based 
detection algorithm. Using McMurray’s (2002) EyeLinkAnal program in Microsoft Access, 
fixations were grouped by area of interest (target, competitor, object 1, object 2, other). In 
all eye movement analyses, trials were excluded if there was more than 33% track loss 
during the ambiguous period following the pronoun or if the participant failed to fixate 
either target or competitor for the entire trial (2.3% of the data)
We are particularly interested in the proportion of time spent looking at the target and 
competitor characters immediately following the pronoun (300 msec following pronoun 
onset until 300 msec following the disambiguation point). We therefore used a variant of 
Barr (2009)’s empirical logit, calculating the empirical logit of the ratio of the duration of 
target looks to the duration of competitor looks during this region: log ((# samples target 
looks + .5)/# samples competitor looks + .5)). This region was 690 msec long on average.
Analysis procedure and control variables: The effects of experimental conditions were 
evaluated in a mixed-effects linear regression model, using SAS proc mixed, including 
random effects for both participants and items, as well as random slopes for manipulated 
variables with respect to both participants and items (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). 
As noted for each analysis, in some cases the random effects were estimated to be zero and 
were thus removed from the model. For each analysis reported, we first built a control model 
to assess the effects of potential control variables (verbtype; List (1,2,3,4); forward vs. 
backward order; first vs. second half; target location (left/right); participant gender (female/
male); whether the participant was fixating the target at the onset of the pronoun (yes/no); 
whether the participant was fixating the competitor at the onset of the pronoun (yes/no). Any 
contributions that were significant at a level of t=1.5 or greater were retained for the final 
analysis.
The final analysis included the predictors of interest; referent (first vs. second mention), our 
metric of trial-initial attention, and visual capture cue. Each of these was also centered. 
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Those control predictors that reached criterion were also included. Control variables were 
deemed important, even though they were also controlled by experiment design, because our 
final analyses used an outcome measure as a predictor (see below). The inclusion of 
fixations at pronoun onset was a conservative choice, with the purpose of ensuring that the 
post-pronominal looks were not simply a function of gazes prior to pronoun processing (i.e., 
baseline effects).
Response analysis procedure: The task that participants performed was to decide if the 
story matched the picture. The primary motivation for this task was to encourage time-
locking between eye movements and the linguistic input (Arnold et al., 2000). An additional 
advantage is that the responses provided some information about listeners’ final 
interpretation of the story. On those trials where the participant said that the story and 
picture did not match, they also provided a verbal explanation of their response. This 
allowed us to identify items where the participant provided a reason that had something to 
do with the pronoun referent (e.g., Birdy isn’t wearing a hat). These were categorized as 
“Pronoun Mismatch” responses. All match responses and mismatches with non-pronoun 
related reasons (e.g., It looks more like a barn, not a farmhouse) were categorized as 
“Pronoun Match” responses. A potential concern with this coding method is that difficulty 
with processing the pronoun in some conditions (e.g., for N2 referents) might lead to more 
Mismatch responses, but if participants cannot articulate the problem with the pronoun, our 
measure would underestimate differences between conditions in responses. However, there 
was no evidence that this was a problem: participants were unlikely to provide non-pronoun-
related explanations for both N1 (4%) and N2 (2%) conditions. Note that this response 
measure is not the same as asking them what they thought the pronoun referred to. Rather, it 
is a measure of whether they were willing to accept the picture as a valid representation of 
the story.
Because match responses were binary, we analyzed them in a multilevel logistic regression, 
using SAS proc glimmix (version 9.1) with a Penalized Quasi-Likelihood (PQL) estimator, 
with a binary distribution and a logit link. The same procedure for including control 
variables was used as for the eye movement analyses.
Results
The goal of this study is to test the hypothesis that listeners’ attention as a discourse 
develops can influence their biases as they seek out potential referents for a pronoun, where 
we manipulated attention at the onset of the story with a brief visual capture. We do this by 
examining the relationship between a) fixations at the start of the trial, and b) fixations when 
the ambiguous pronoun is encountered. We begin by examining fixations at the start of each 
trial.
Trial-initial attention: eye gaze at the start of the trial—We first examined looks to 
the animate characters as the trial began, as a way to assess how trial-initial attention was 
influenced by item features, both manipulated and control characteristics. We expected 
listeners to visually attend to the character who appeared at the location of the visual capture 
cue, which appeared for 200 msec immediately prior to the onset of the stimulus picture. We 
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also expected attention at trial onset to be constrained by a bias toward the left-hand 
character (Dahan, Tanenhaus, & Salverda, 2007).
Figure 3 illustrates the average allocation of visual attention during the first sentence of the 
story. Looks are plotted as the proportion of looks to N1 out of both N1 and N2, and as a 
function of both screen location (left vs. right) and capture cue (N1 cued vs. not cued). As 
the figure shows, the flash (i.e., capture cue) attracted attention before picture onset. When 
N1 was cued, proportion N1 looks were very high. When N2 was cued, looks to N2 were 
high, which shows up on this graph as a negative value for proportion of N1 looks. In 
addition, participants spent more time fixating the left-side character than the right-side 
character. After the first second of the trial, the effects of the physical properties of the 
stimulus diminished, and instead looks were influenced by the verbal input. The fact that all 
lines are above the 50% line at this point reveals a general bias toward the first-mentioned 
character.
We therefore chose the first second as the region for measuring the participant’s attention at 
the start of the trial. This “Trial-initial attention” metric was calculated as the proportion of 
looks to the target out of all looks to both characters1. While this measure is rough, it 
provides an approximate handle on the participant’s attention during the first second of the 
trial. To assess its relationship to predictors of interest, we built a model of trial-initial target 
looks, as predicted by condition (N1 vs. N2), flash (N1 vs. N2), and target location (left vs. 
right), plus control variables (List, forward, and participant gender)2. Trial-initial target 
looks were greater when the target flashed (β=.24; t=9.67, p<.001), when it was on the left (β 
=.34, t=8.0, p<.001). When two-way interactions between the condition, flash, and target 
location predictors were added to the model, they did not significantly predict trial-initial 
looks, and did not change the pattern of results.
A related question is whether looks at the onset of the trial reflect general viewing 
preferences for that picture, as opposed to processes related to the establishment of the 
discourse context. If so, we might expect Trial-initial attention to predict gazing throughout 
the trial. To examine this question, we analyzed participants’ fixations between the 
sentences, i.e., from the offset of sentence 1 up to the onset of sentence 2 (avg. 430 msec). 
At this point, the “target” was not distinctive, because the pronoun had not yet been 
mentioned. As expected, a model of the target empirical logit revealed that it was not 
predicted by any of the critical predictors (condition: β = .099, p = .68; target flash: β = 
−0.13, p = .54; trial-initial attention: β = .13, p = .62) or control variables (List)3. This 
demonstrated that trial-initial attention did not have widespread effects on gaze preferences.
The effect of the trial-initial attention on pronoun resolution—The critical 
question was whether trial-initial attention affected gaze preferences in the ambiguous 
region following the pronoun. The effect of trial-initial attention is shown in Table 1 and 
Figure 4. For presentational purposes, we binned trials into either “High attention” (greater 
1For the 25 trials on which there were no looks to either target or competitor in the first second, trial-initial attention to target was 
scored as 0.
2This model had a random slope for condition by items only, and a random slope by capture cue by both subjects and items.
3This model had a random slope for condition by both subjects and items, and a random slope by capture cue by both subjects only.
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than 50% looks in the first second) or “Low attention” (fewer than 50% looks in the first 
second), although Trial-initial attention was entered into the statistical model as a gradient 
predictor. High attention trials were often those where the target was cued, but not always.
As Figure 4 shows, there were more looks to N1 than N2, for both N1 and N2 target 
conditions. This reflects the well-known N1 advantage. In addition, there was a boost in 
post-pronominal fixations for characters that had been attended at trial onset. For the N1-
target trials (top panels), trial-initial attention to the target supported the N1 bias, resulting in 
little competition from the N2 character. For the N2-target trials (bottom panels), trial-initial 
attention to the target served to eliminate the on-line bias to N1.
A multilevel mixed effects model was used to assess the effects of pronoun target (N1 and 
N2) and trial-initial attention on character looks, where the dependent variable was the 
empirical logit of target looks during the post-pronominal ambiguous region. For the model, 
trial-initial attention was included as a continuous predictor, using the proportion looks to 
the target out of all character looks. The attentional cueing manipulation was also included 
as a critical predictor, since it was manipulated, and provided a critical comparison for the 
trial-initial attention predictor. As shown in Table 2, there was a significant effect of 
pronoun target, such that there were greater looks to N1 than N2 characters in the 
ambiguous region. There was also a significant effect of trial-initial attention, such that there 
were more post-pronominal target looks when the target had also been attended at trial 
onset. The attentional cueing manipulation itself did not contribute to the model. Note that 
the same critical pattern obtains even if all the control predictors are excluded from the 
model.
Responses: We also asked whether trial-initial attention affected responses. As shown in 
Table 2, there was a significant effect of target referent (N1 vs. N2), reflecting the finding 
that Match responses were more common for N1 than N2 referents. In addition, there was a 
small effect of trial-initial attention for responses in the N2 condition, where Match 
responses were higher when N2 had been attended. This emerged as a marginally significant 
effect of trial-initial attention in the model. Even though trial-initial attention had a greater 
effect on N2 targets, the interaction term (target x trial-initial attention) was not significant 
when added to the model. Nonetheless, the marginal effect was clearly driven by the N2 
target items. A separate analysis of just N2 target trials revealed a significant effect of trial-
initial attention (t = 2.25; p = .025).
Discussion
Experiment 1 demonstrated that participants’ attention at the onset of the trial was 
systematically related to two measures of pronoun resolution: 1) looks during the ambiguous 
region following the pronoun, and 2) responses to the offline picture verification task. These 
effects occurred despite the fact that participants were not aware of the visual capture cue 
that temporarily attracted their attention to one side of the screen.
At the same time, the effects of visual attention were secondary to the strong effects of order 
of mention. As expected, first-mentioned (N1) characters were preferred as the referents of 
the pronoun, both online and offline. The strength of order-of-mention as a discourse cue 
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was especially apparent in the offline findings. This suggests that even though initial 
attention modulated on-line consideration of referents, public discourse cues had the 
strongest effects on final interpretation.
Nevertheless, it is notable that we found even a small effect of egocentric attention. The 
participant’s focus of attention at the onset of the trial was driven primarily by two sources 
of information, both of which were external to the discourse context: the capture cue, and 
being on the left side of the picture. Since none of the participants were aware of the capture 
cue, its effect is tantamount to any other pressure on the listener’s private attention. That is, 
there is no public information that the cued character should be attended – for all the 
listeners know, they just happened to attend to the cued character. This provides clear 
evidence that the effects of attention on discourse accessibility go beyond the linguistic 
discourse context, and also go beyond shared attention more generally.
Experiment 2 examines the extent of this effect, by asking whether the effects of trial-initial 
attention persist in the presence of a public, shared attentional capture cue. If the cue is more 
visually salient, will listeners view it as a part of the discourse record and ignore their own 
attentional biases?
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 pits the listeners’ own attentional biases at the onset of the story against a 
visually salient exogenous capture cue that occurred as the second character was mentioned. 
This experiment permits us to dissociate the effects of attention at trial onset from the effects 
of shared attentional cues. The task was identical to that of Exp. 1, except the capture cue 
was a yellow halo around one character, which appeared in the middle of the first sentence. 
This manipulation had three key properties. First, it was not concurrent with trial onset, 
which meant that trial-initial attention could be assessed separately from the capture cue. 
Second, it occurred immediately preceding the mention of the second character in the first 
sentence of the story. This tests an alternate hypothesis that referential accessibility is 
affected by attention at the moment that the characters are mentioned. The second-
mentioned character has the most ambiguous accessibility (i.e., it is somewhat accessible by 
virtue of having been mentioned, but not highly accessible like N1 is), and thus has the most 
potential to be affected by an attentional manipulation. Third, the capture cue was more 
salient than the cue in Experiment 1, and all participants were aware of it. This awareness 
was necessary, since any visual capture cue that disrupts the static scene would be noticed. 
This created a further contrast between the participant’s own attention at trial onset, and the 
salient, public visual capture cue.
Method
Participants—A total of 51 psychology students at UNC Chapel Hill participated for 
course credit. Data from three were not analyzed at all (1 reported having attention deficit 
disorder; and data for 2 participants data were lost due to technical problems. An additional 
13 were excluded because of problems with track calibration, using the same criteria as for 
Exp. 1.
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Design, Materials, and Procedure—The task, apparatus and procedure were identical 
to Experiment 1 except for the nature of the attention capture cue. A yellow halo around 
either N1 or N2 appeared for 200 msec, beginning 200 msec prior to the mention of the 
second character (see Figure 5). Since it takes about 200 msec to program and launch a 
saccade (Matin, Shao, & Boff, 1993), this should result in saccades to N2 around the time its 
name is mentioned. All other aspects of the design and procedure were the same, except that 
participants viewed the picture for 400 msec before the story began, not 200 msec.
Results and Discussion
As before, trials were excluded if there was more than 33% track loss during the post-
pronominal ambiguous period, or if the participant failed to fixate either target or competitor 
for the entire trial (3.7% of all trials). We again categorized items by trial-initial attention 
during the first second of the trial, using the same procedure as in Exp. 1 (proportion target 
looks out of all target and competitor looks). Since the capture cue did not occur until 
between 1253 and 2244 msec into the trial, these early fixations were unaffected by the 
capture cue, and instead were driven by the participants’ own decisions about where to 
fixate. In this experiment participants spent more time fixating the left character in the first 
second than the right. An analysis of looks in the first second revealed that it was influenced 
by target location (left/right; β = 0.44, p < .001); first mention (β = .09, p = .007); but not by 
the capture cue, which had not occurred at that point (β = −0.02, p = .4)4.
All participants reported after the experiment that they were aware of the visual capture. 
This meant that the results provided a good contrast between the effects of unconscious, 
internally-driven attention at the onset of the story, and a visual capture cue that was obvious 
yet not really a part of the story task itself.
Eye movement analyses—Again we analyzed the dependent variable of empirical logit 
of target looks during the ambiguous region after the pronoun, i.e. from 300 after pronoun 
onset until 300 msec after the disambiguating word. Attention at trial onset was calculated in 
the same way as for Experiment 1. As shown in Table 3 and Figure 6, target looks after the 
pronoun were more likely if the target had been attended at the onset of the trial. In addition, 
as expected, target looks after the pronoun were greater for N1 than N2 targets.
To assess the statistical significance of these patterns, these data were again submitted to 
linear mixed effects models, following the same procedure as for experiment 1. The control 
predictors were the same, except for the fact that target location (right/left) was excluded as 
a predictor. The reason for this is that trial-initial looks were primarily driven by screen 
location, where left-side targets were fixated more often. As shown in Table 4, looks 
following the pronoun were influenced by both target referent (N1 vs. N2), and trial-initial 
attention. The capture cue manipulation had no effect on post-pronominal looks.
As in Experiment 1, we examined the possibility that trial-initial attention revealed general 
gazing preferences for the picture, and not pronoun comprehension specifically. If so, trial-
4This analysis included random intercepts for both subjects and items, and a random slope for first mention by items only and for 
capture cue by subject only.
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initial attention should predict target looks throughout the story. We again examined gazes 
during the period between sentence 1 and sentence 2, and found no effect of trial-initial 
attention (β = .01, p = .98), capture cue (β =−.36, p = .11), or condition (β = .22, p = .31)5. If 
target location is added to this model, it has no effect and does not change the pattern of 
results.
Response Data Analysis—As shown in Table 3, participants were more likely to 
provide Match responses for N1 than N2. They were also numerically more likely to 
respond Match when N2 had been attended at trial onset (31%) than when it had not (23%). 
However, the effect of trial-initial attention was not significant in the model (See table 4). 
Instead, there was a marginal effect of the capture cue on responses. Match responses were 
higher for N2 targets that were cued (31%) than those that were not cued (24%), while 
Match responses were high for N1 targets overall (cued: 95%; uncued: 93%).
Discussion
Experiment 2 provided further evidence that on-line pronoun resolution is influenced by the 
participants’ attention at trial onset. This effect emerged in a task in which visual attention 
was cued publically, with an obvious yellow flash cue in the middle of the story. Despite the 
salience of the visual cue, trial-initial attention had a greater effect than the capture cue on 
where participants looked following the pronoun. As in Experiment 1, trial-initial attention 
was an egocentric experience: participants were aware of the later flash, but initial attention 
was guided by stimuli characteristics that are not usually considered a part of the discourse 
record, such as being on the left side of the screen. This early attention did not have effects 
on the entire trial, but did emerge later when the ambiguous pronoun was encountered. Its 
effects on postpronominal looks is consistent with the hypothesized link between pronoun 
processing and the role of attention in establishing discourse representations of the 
characters.
A potential concern is that in this experiment, trial-initial attention was heavily influenced 
by the bias toward left-side characters. This means that we must consider two possible 
interpretations of the effect of trial-initial attention. One possibility is that post-pronominal 
looks were biased toward the attended character precisely because it had been attended at 
story onset, which resulted in a more developed discourse representation. A second 
possibility is that the bias toward the attended character in this experiment is really a bias 
toward the left-side character. We know that the left-side bias cannot be a general viewing 
preference, in that left-sidedness did not affect looks prior to the pronoun, in the inter-
sentential region. Yet it is still possible that the effect of initial attention may be merely a 
preference to look at the left character at the moment of pronoun resolution. While the data 
for experiment 2 do not distinguish these possibilities, the effect of the left-side bias is 
inconsistent across experiments. This favors an interpretation in which gazing preferences at 
story onset affect discourse accessibility, which then affects online biases during pronoun 
processing. We will return to this in the general discussion.
5This model included random intercepts for both subjects and items, and a random slope for pronoun target but subjects only, and for 
capture cue by items only.
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In contrast with Experiment 1, however, in this experiment the participants’ offline 
responses were somewhat guided by the capture cue, and not by trial-initial attention. This is 
likely to result from the salient nature of the capture cue in this experiment. Participants 
were all aware of the yellow halo, and they may have taken it as an intended signal about the 
importance of the N2 character to the story. Other studies have shown that listeners can use 
social cues, like pointing, to help identify referents for ambiguous pronouns (Nappa & 
Arnold, 2014; Goodrich & Hudson Kam, 2009; Goodrich Smith & Hudson Kam, 2012).
Nevertheless, the attentional effects in this experiment were again secondary to the effects of 
the discourse. The predominant finding was that listeners preferred to link pronouns with N1 
targets. This replicates the well-established finding that entities in subject or first-mentioned 
position tend to be salient, and preferred as pronoun targets (Arnold et al., 2001; 
Gernsbacher & Hargreaves, 1988; Gernsbacher et al., 1989; Jarvikivi et al., 2005; Kaiser & 
Trueswell, 2004).
General Discussion
Two experiments demonstrated that when listeners consider potential referents for a 
pronoun, they are initially biased toward the character that they attended at the beginning of 
the story. In Experiment 1, the listener’s attention to one character at the start of the story 
increased the likelihood of considering that character as a potential referent for a pronoun 
that occurred later in the story, as indexed by fixations to that character following the 
pronoun. Attention at story onset was driven by the listener’s idiosyncratic biases, as well as 
character location and our visual capture cue. Neither of these determinants of attention 
were significant predictors of post-pronominal looks, supporting the conclusion that it is the 
actual attention to the character that matters, and not the reason for that attention (see 
Gleitman et al., 2007, for a similar effect on production). In experiment 2, we again 
observed the effect of trial-initial attention, and the later capture cue did not modulate post-
pronominal fixations – despite the fact that participants were more likely to notice it. The 
trial-initial biases were not indicators of general gaze preferences, in that they did not 
correlate with looks in the inter-sentential region. Rather, they specifically predicted looks 
during the post-pronominal period.
These findings suggest that attention at the beginning of a story can modulate the effects of 
the linguistic context on referent accessibility. If so, this would predict that similar effects of 
attention should occur in an experiment where there were no attentional capture cues 
whatsoever. This is precisely what we found in another study (Arnold, 2015). This 
experiment used the same paradigm as the experiments reported here, without capture cues 
of any sort, for the purposes of investigating variation in the strength of the N1 bias between 
men and women. The exact same measure of trial-initial attention was included as a control 
measure, and it yielded the same effect as reported here. In that study, target location again 
guided trial-initial attention, but not as strongly as in Experiment 2. Importantly, while trial-
initial attention significantly predicted post-pronominal gazes, target location did not.
Thus, across three experiments we have consistent evidence that attention at the onset of a 
story increases the likelihood of considering the attended character when an ambiguous 
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referential expression is encountered. The sources of these attentional modulations include 
attentional capture, and properties of the stimuli, like left-side location – neither of which 
are properties that are typically considered a part of the discourse representation. At the 
broadest level, these findings support claims from the literature that attention is related to 
referential accessibility. Although this hypothesis is well accepted in the literature, it has 
received little explicit examination. Thus, this is the first solid evidence that referential 
accessibility is related to the comprehender’s attention, and not limited to either “focus” as a 
linguistic construct, or cues to shared attention.
In contrast with the clear effects of egocentric attention on on-line processing, we found less 
consistent evidence that it affected participants’ final Match responses. These findings lead 
to two conclusions. On one hand, the minor effects of attention on responses suggest that 
attentional modulations of accessibility can have real effects for discourse understanding. 
On the other hand, the relative strength of the discourse cue over the listener’s attention 
highlights the strong contrast between public and private sources of information about 
referent interpretation. The strongest constraints on discourse comprehension stem from 
public, task-related sources of information, such as the linguistic discourse context.
The timecourse of attentional effects during reference processing
The results reported here also highlight the importance of attention at the story onset. The 
target’s accessibility was boosted by comprehender’s attention to the target in the first 
second of the story – but not at other points of the story. This boost occurred regardless of 
whether the comprehender’s trial-initial attention was influenced by a capture cue (exp. 1), 
or not (exp. 2, and Arnold, 2015).
We propose that our findings are consistent with the idea that attention is important in the 
establishment of a discourse representation, in which some characters are represented with 
greater accessibility. We know that discourse processing involves the construction of non-
linguistic representations of discourse entities and events (e.g., van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; 
Kintsch, 1988; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Bransford, Barclay & Franks, 1972, Bower & Morrow, 
1990; Sanford & Garrod 1981; Zwaan & Radvansky 1998). These representations may be 
more or less activated, where activation is gradient and influenced by multiple sources of 
information (Ariel, 1990, 2001). We hypothesize that trial-initial attention increases the 
activation of the representations of discourse entities, making them more available when the 
pronoun is encountered. It is at story onset that the listener is instantiating a discourse 
representation, and the relatively more attended entities are represented with more 
activation. Under this view, discourse cues should also influence the activation of each 
representation. While we do not have specific evidence that attentional mechanisms also 
mediate the influence of discourse information, it is possible that they do.
We conjecture that trial-initial attention was relevant in these experiments precisely because 
it preceded the linguistic information itself. The linguistic first-mentioned bias is inherently 
probabilistic (e.g., Arnold et al., 2000): while pronouns do tend to refer to first-mentioned 
characters, they can also refer to second-mentioned characters. At the onset of the story, 
listeners need to establish their perspective on the story. Their private attentional shifts may 
influence the way they interpret subsequent, probabilistic linguistic input, either 
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strengthening or weakening the first-mentioned bias. Thus, trial-initial attention was 
important because it was directed towards characters that were relevant to the later 
discourse. Once participants attended to a character, it may have led to further processing of 
the character and its role in the story. To the extent that the capture cue modulated trial-
initial attention, our findings are consistent with evidence that endogenous (task-related) 
goals mitigate the effect of exogenous cues (Folk et al., 1992).
Thus, the current evidence is consistent with models in which the search for the referent of a 
pronoun is guided by the accessibility of the discourse representation. Pronouns are 
pragmatically specialized, in that they favor accessible referents. Thus, once a pronoun is 
encountered, it triggers the use of accessibility representations to guide the consideration of 
potential referents. Thus, character accessibility does not influence discourse comprehension 
in general, but specifically when relevant, such as when a referring expression is 
encountered.
Under this view, the listener’s attention is more important in the construction of a discourse 
representation than at the moment of encountering a pronoun. This explains the constrast 
between the current data and those of Nappa and Arnold (2014, Exp. 2), who report that 
egocentric attention at the moment of hearing a pronoun (as opposed to at story onset) does 
not affect pronoun comprehension. Nappa and Arnold had participants watch videos of a 
speaker telling a story about two co-present puppets. At pronoun onset, a capture cue (a 
black square) appeared at the location of one puppet. Even though the capture cue increased 
judgments about character location, it did not influence either judgments about the pronoun 
referent or speed of response. By contrast, the only relevant attentional cues at pronoun 
onset were social ones: pointing, gazing, or a novel condition in which the speaker claimed 
that she controlled the black squares on screen. These findings are consistent with the idea 
that the role of egocentric attention only has its effect as character representations are being 
formed, early in the story. Once these representations are established, later modulations of 
egocentric attention are irrelevant.
The task-relevance of the cued characters in our experiment may also explain another 
apparent paradox: visual attention is often attracted to new information, whereas linguistic 
discourse cues typically attract attention to old or topical information – yet both facilitated 
on-line pronoun resolution. In our study, this may have occurred because the critical 
moment of attention occurred immediately preceding the onset of the story. All task 
information at this point was new. But this was also the point at which listeners began to 
assess exactly how central each mentioned entity was to the story. Thus, both visual and 
linguistic cues may have influenced the expectancy of hearing a later reference to that 
character (Arnold, 1998; 2008).
Our interpretation of the results is consistent with a characterization of accessibility as a 
gradient property of entity representations. This is consistent with Foraker & McElree’s 
(2007) claim that discourse accessibility does not involve putting a single entity into a 
privileged, focal category. In our experiments, attention only subtly modulated referential 
accessibility, showing no evidence that attention led to the privileged focusing of the 
attended character. It also seems unlikely that participants were aware of their visual 
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attention at trial onset, suggesting their attention was not being actively directed or 
maintained.
Shared vs. egocentric attention
Our study used measures of the listener’s private attentional biases, at the onset of the story. 
These provided the clearest evidence that the kind of attention that affects pronoun 
processing is more than just a linguistic construct. There was no sense in which the capture 
cue or the stimulus-specific properties of a character could be construed as a part of the 
discourse record.
This finding speaks against a strong interpretation of models in which pronoun 
comprehension is only guided by information in common ground. Proponents of such 
models might argue that our data are consistent with a vaguer sense of shared attention, in 
which the listener assumes that anything that they experience is also available to their 
interloctutor. However, this extreme “you know what I know” assumption is much weaker 
than the common view is that referential accessibility specifically emerges from assumptions 
about the attention or knowledge of one’s discourse partners (e.g., Brennan, 1995; Chafe, 
1994; Gundel et al., 1993). We have demonstrated that on-line biases during pronoun 
comprehension are influenced by information that is not public, and certainly not established 
as shared information. We observed a more general effect of participants’ own decisions 
about where to attend in the first second of the trial, which can hardly be taken as evidence 
of shared attention. The capture cue in Experiment 1 contributed to the initial-attention 
effect, but participants were not aware of it. This provides striking evidence that the effects 
of attention on referential accessibility are not limited to situations where attention is clearly 
shared.
Nevertheless, we do not take these results as evidence that pronoun comprehension is 
primarily the result of egocentric representations of accessibility. While we found significant 
effects of trial-initial attention, they emerged most strongly in our measures of on-line 
consideration of potential referents, i.e. in the eye movement analyses. Responses were 
overwhelmingly driven by linguistic status: pronouns referring to first-mentioned characters 
were accepted far more often than pronouns referring to second-mentioned characters. This 
is consistent with claims that reference should be interpreted with respect to shared 
information (e.g., Brennan, 1995; Gundel et al., 1993; Clark, 1996; Chafe, 1994).
However, listeners may not always keep track of the source of their attentional modulations. 
Whether they attend to a character because it is important to the story, because it was cued, 
or because it occurred on the left side of the screen, this attention still contributes to later 
pronoun processing. This is consistent with mounting evidence the mechanisms of language 
processing do not categorically ignore entities that are unknown to their speaker when 
identifying referents for nominal expressions (Barr & Keysar, 2006; Hanna, Trueswell, & 
Tanenhaus, 2003; Hanna & Tanenhaus, 2004; Keysar, Barr, Balin & Brauner, 2000).
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In sum, we have provided evidence that private shifts of attention influence both listener’s 
transitory biases during pronoun resolution, and to a lesser extent, listener’s final 
interpretation of the pronoun. This study provides the first evidence about the relationship 
between attention at trial onset, and later reference resolution, in a visual-world eyetracking 
study. It also supports widespread claims that pronoun comprehension is driven by 
modulations in the attention of discourse participants, which make some referents more 
accessible than others.
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Appendix
Verbal stimuli for Experiments 1 and 2
Source-Goal items
Birdy brought some mail to Doggy during a big rainstorm. He was carrying an umbrella, 
which was a lucky thing.
Bunny showed a sculpture to Kitty outside the art museum. She had brought a camera to 
take pictures of the artwork.
Doggy gave some batting tips to Birdy on a sunny day at the park. He held the bat carefully 
to ensure a good grip.
Doggy read a story to Birdy near a tree outside. He sat on a log because the ground was wet.
Kitty floated over to Bunny at the pool party. She had a bag of chips for everyone to eat.
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Kitty sang a song to Bunny at the school car wash. She scrubbed the window carefully so it 
would sparkle in the sun.
Kitty taught a song to Bunny at the neighborhood cookout. She sang really badly and ruined 
the song.
Kitty taught the hula to Bunny near some palm trees. She took a sip of her soda because it 
was a hot day.
Joint-Action items
Birdy picked apples with Doggy near the farmhouse. He was wearing a hat to protect 
himself from the sun.
Birdy played board games with Doggy during the snowstorm. He picked up the dice because 
it was his turn to roll.
Birdy walked around the amusment park with Doggy in the rain. He got an ice cream cone 
even though it was cold and rainy.
Birdy went rollerskating with Doggy at the playground. He brought a frisbee so they could 
play with it later.
Bunny baked some cookies with Kitty with a brand new recipe. She took out a carton of 
milk to go with the cookies.
Bunny drew pictures with Kitty beneath the rainbow. She used a paintbrush to capture the 
vibrant colors.
Bunny threw a party with Kitty with a big piñata. She took a piece of cake and accidentally 
knocked the rest of it off the table.
Bunny went shopping with Kitty at the new mall. She wanted to buy a new watch because 
her old one was broken.
Doggy ate a snack with Birdy at the fruit stand He chose an apple because it looked really 
fresh.
Doggy made soup with Birdy in a big pot on the stove. He picked up the spoon to taste the 
soup.
Doggy went kite flying with Birdy near a bench in the park. He stood on a rock so that his 
kite would fly highest.
Kitty went sightseeing with Bunny at the old Spanish castle. She had brought a guide book 
for more information.
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Sample visual stimuli for Experiment 1, in a) first-mentioned pronoun condition, and b) 
second-mentioned pronoun condition. A sample first-mentioned capture cue is given in c).
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Example timing of visual stimuli for Exp. 1 (N2 target, N1 cued condition). After 
participants initiated the trial, a capture cue appeared at the location of one character for 200 
msec. The picture appeared for 200 msec before the story begins. (The story was heard only 
and not shown on screen).
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Proportion of looks to N1 (the first-mentioned character) out of all looks to the two 
characters (i.e., N1/(N1+N2) at each time point during the first sentence of the story, as a 
function of the cueing and left/right position of N1. Note that when N1 was not cued, N2 
was cued. The first character’s name began at story onset; the second character’s name 
began on average 1298 ms later. The pronoun began on average 430 msec after the end of 
sentence 1. Lines toward the top of the graph indicate greater looks to N1 than N2; lines 
toward the bottom of the graph indicate greater looks to N2 than N1.
Arnold and Lao Page 30














Experiment 1 Results. Percentage looks (average participant means) to the N1 and N2 
characters over time, where 0 marks the onset of the pronoun. The top panels depict N1-
target conditions; the bottom panels depict N2-target conditions. The left panels represent 
those trials on which the target had been attended at trial onset; the right panels represent 
those trials on which the competitor (rather than the target) had been attended at trial onset.
Arnold and Lao Page 31














Sample visual stimulus for Experiment 2. The main picture (a) is followed by a 200 ms 
presentation of either (b) or (c), followed again by (a).
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Experiment 2 Results. Percentage looks (average participant means) to the N1 and N2 
characters over time, where 0 marks the onset of the pronoun. The top panels depict N1-
target conditions; the bottom panels depict N2-target conditions. The left panels represent 
those trials on which the target had been attended at trial onset; the right panels represent 
those trials on which the competitor (rather than the target) had been attended at trial onset.
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